Operation Linebacker & Linebacker II

The Cold War solicits an examination of many topics and viewpoints within the confines of military history.  From the theater to tactical level of operations, one can attain a large swath of diversity in various problems, solutions, leadership, execution of orders, and strategy.  One of the most significant conflicts of the Cold War era for the United States is the Vietnam War.  Far too easy is it to examine the Vietnam War through the lens of social history.  After all, this era highlighted a previously insurmountable number of domestic changes for the United States.  However, within the confines of military history, the Vietnam War shows many strengths and weaknesses that the United States would be forced to compile into a future of lessons learned.  One of the key notes of the Vietnam War was the air campaign, specifically the Linebacker sorties.  In fact, the Linebacker operations proved to be effective enough that they presented the potential to end the war by driving the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table.

To effectively understand the nature of Linebacker and the Vietnam War, a brief orientation of the situation in Southeast Asia and former French-Indochina is necessary.  French-Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam for the purposes of this essay), historically had been under some form of colonial rule long before western contact.[1] French colonialism in the region had begun in 1887, but hardships in the region stemmed further back into the Nguyen Dynastic era.  Through World War II, the French retained control of the region until overthrown by the Japanese during their sweeping through the Pacific in the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.[2] The Japanese were notorious for treating conquered indigenous people as lower classes and generally found use for the populations as slaves for the perceived superior Japanese citizenry and businesses.  However, the French were not far better, often seeing the Vietnamese people as beneath the social class of other Western ethnicities and backgrounds.  Both Japan and France’s interest in Vietnam were a combination of economic and strategic reasons.

The establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 saw the networking of Western governments presenting a unified defensive front that was designed to counter the growing Soviet bloc.  Among the members were the United States, France, and Great Britain.  The United States, for the first time in its history, was henceforth acting as a global guarantor of defense and security practices for other nations.[3] Likewise, in comparison to the other member nations of NATO at the time of its establishment, the United States was a much stronger nation compared to the ravaged nations of Western Europe.  Among those nations was the previously war-torn country of France, a long-time colonial power that was steadily losing grip on its foreign assets and its status as an empire.  While the French were not exclusively having difficulties in Indochina,[4] the request for aid from the French by the mid-late 1950s included the evacuation of the region and the sustaining and maintaining of control.

The fall of China into the hands of Communists in 1949 spurred a growing Western interest in East Asia, particularly the smaller colonial assets in French-Indochina and the smaller formerly occupied region of Korea. [5]  By the late 1940s, the United States had adopted a concern of a certain “domino-effect” in relation to the fall of smaller regimes to the influence of Communism.  The fear was that smaller nations that were more susceptible to being overthrown were at the greatest risk.  This led to two pieces of legislation that allowed the United States to impress its military power into the peacekeeping realm more-so than it ever had prior.  The doctrinal portion of this legislation came in the form of the Truman Doctrine,[6] where the law and application incarnation came in the form of NSC-68.[7] Combined, these two pieces formed the nucleus of foreign military policy that would be executed for the Korean campaign.  They also were to form the basis of all forthcoming military intervention in Eastern Asia.

By the time the Korean War entered a state of armistice in 1953, the French were slowly beginning their total withdrawal from Vietnam.  The French were forced to hasten their retreat in 1954 with the attacks at Dien Bien Fu.[8] It was at this time that the French requested formal aid from the United States.  However, after a stalemate in Korea and a declining public opinion, the Eisenhower was not able to fully commit resources to an intervention in Vietnam.  Instead, he opted to deploy advisors to Southeast Asia.  This also culminated an additional security organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), established to provide additional coalition response in the region and provide some form of stability.  Ultimately, SEATO would provide little overall protection.[9]

The French were fully driven out of Indochina in 1954, which ultimately had left control of North Vietnam to the Viet Minh in the capital of Hanoi. [10] Meanwhile, to the South, a U.S. backed government was established in Saigon.  This division of North and South was agreed to in the 1954 Geneva Peace Conference, but the conference did little to address growing disharmony and conflict brewing in the SEATO territories.[11]  Likewise, in many instances, the U.S. backed government proved itself to be just as tyrannical as the governments it was known to usurp.[12]  Growing unrest in the South, led to an incursion of North sympathizers that threatened the Southern regime in Saigon by 1957.[13]  The United States was on its way to being pulled into the full brunt of the Vietnam War.  Despite U.S. efforts to curb Diem, the South Vietnamese leader, an uptick in insurgency swept through the small nation of Vietnam in both the North and South.[14]

In previous conflicts, the U.S. had made use of a well-defined Air Force both across the U.S. Army and the newly formed U.S. Air Force.  During World War II, this U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) was involved with coalition bombing campaigns that swept across Europe to contain the Axis Powers.  In the Pacific theater, the same force was involved with long-range, high-altitude bombing campaigns and deployment of atomic payloads.  The United States had always deployed a formulated means to its bombing sorties.  Operation Pointblank was the combined Royal Air Force (RAF) and USAAF campaign that encompassed the European theater, culminating what some high-ranking officers boasted as a campaign that would “make invasion unnecessary.” [15] The USAAF had agreed to daytime bombing campaigns with escort fighters, whereas the RAF conducted nighttime firebombing campaigns against Axis targets.[16]

The Combined Bomber Offensive in Europe was an example of unified bombing operations between Allied powers, but it was also an example of an attempt to use airpower exclusively to force an enemy to submit.  Unfortunately, the Allies would have to change their plan of attack to using bombers to hitting larger targets: manufacturing centers, weapons and munitions depots, transportation hubs, research facilities, air force bases, and other large, massed locations.  By late 1943, the entirety of Pointblank was established for the preparation of Overlord, with resources being directed towards elements of the Luftwaffe.  This contrasted with the combined air forces generally ignoring operations during Torch.  Nevertheless, Allied bombers accounted for over three million tons of bombs dropped on Europe during World War II with relatively poor accuracy.  All but for the instance of the Overlord campaign and the reduction of V-weapons in Germany, the Combined Bomber Offensive was largely a mission to stagger the enemy, rather than to eliminate them.[17]

While the Combined Bomber Offensive arguably worked in a limited capacity during World War II, its outcomes were questionable at best.  The lack of suitable and sustainable damage provided by the Allies due to poor targeting systems resulted in more collateral damage than effective damage.[18]  Airborne losses were heavy, with a fair number of materiel and personnel losses during the longevity of Pointblank and the subsequent Crossbow operations collectively.[19]  Elsewhere, in the Pacific theater, bombing campaigns had limited to no effective impacts outside of mainland Japan.  Naval bombardments of Okinawa and Iwo Jima were notoriously a failure,[20] and contingency bombing operations at Midway against naval targets were equally disastrous.[21]

By the time of Vietnam, targeting methodology had improved greatly, and Air Force Secretary Curtis LeMay was confident that his force could deliver decisive blows against the North Vietnamese. [22] Once again, the methodology of delivering such a blow was the use of strategic bombing on a scale that the world had not seen since the Combined Bomber Offensive.  LeMay was quite vocal about the USAF capabilities he perceived to break the insurgent threat in North Vietnam, but that still did not deter the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, from remaining skeptical that the Air Force could on its own bring the North to its knees.[23]  The year was 1965, and the task at hand was the creation of what would become Operation Rolling Thunder.

The operation commenced on 2 March 1965 and was focused almost exclusively on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the life support supply line that reached into South Vietnam and fueling insurgents in the region. [24]  A continuous and sustained bombing campaign was established as a need, but the buildup to such a campaign and the breadth of that campaign were in question. [25] However, the Johnson Administration opted for a gradual introduction of Rolling Thunder over the course of several phases.  Communication, supply lines, and then depots were the primary orders of targets selected for Rolling Thunder, much like the selection of targets over twenty years earlier. [26]  McNamara continued to doubt the overall success and likelihood of Rolling Thunder’s success through 1967, stating that success was a possibility, not a guarantee.[27]  Nevertheless, the campaign wrapped up late in 1968 after deploying B-58’s, F-105’s, B-52’s, and F-4’s on numerous sorties across the North and disrupting a fair amount of communication and commerce in the region.[28]

Despite the perceived best attempts of the Air Force to crack the North Vietnamese forces, the war continued to rage, and supply continued to flow into insurgent cells beyond 1968.  American ground movements continued to be hindered by hidden tunnelways and systems that were entrenched in the terrain by the Vietnamese, mimicking what the Marines had seen in Okinawa and Iwo Jima during the War in the Pacific.  The North had taken precautions to reduce the risk of high-asset damage during Rolling Thunder, largely keeping important materiel hidden and using helicopters as the primary air-to-air defense mechanism. [29] Furthermore, the trail had curved well into the neighboring nations of Laos and Cambodia.  An influx of materiel aid and support was flowing into the North from China, who was brokering supplies between the North Vietnamese and the Soviets by proxy.[30]  On the surface, the war in Vietnam appeared to be one of a large superpower against a smaller nation, however beneath that was a proxy war that had brought the Cold War into a Luke-Warm stage.  Even still, beneath this stage was a layer of outrage that had stemmed since the former Nguyen Dynasty.  This was a war of insurgency that the French had failed to understand, and the Americans were running the risk of making the same mistakes perceiving a threat that could be eliminated entirely by the air.

When attacks continued well after the conclusion of Rolling Thunder, the Nixon Administration opted to send a message to Hanoi via the use of B-52 bombers striking deep into North territory.  The attacks were in response to the Easter Offensive launched by the North against forces in the South.  The strike of B-52’s combined with a threat of a naval blockade and a further sustained bombing campaign was hopeful to be enough to force Hanoi to the negotiating table.  However, when the North did not cave to the threat, Operation Linebacker I was launched as promised.  Nixon had desired a “strong, threatening, and effective” campaign that would send a message that the United States was prepared to bring the North to its knees if necessary.[31]  This is not dissimilar to Pershing’s own stance on the eve of the Armistice in 1918.  Linebacker I was designed to pick up where Rolling Thunder had left off as a major campaign targeting supply, communication, and transportation hubs for the North.  Likewise, with Nixon’s newfound communication with both the Chinese and Soviets, the U.S. was able to deep dive into neighboring nations and press on the North harder than ever before with lesser risk for outside intervention.[32]

Unlike Rolling Thunder, which had a questionable outcome, Linebacker I had arguably devastating implications on the North.  With a campaign area that included the entirety of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and leading deep into North territory, the air campaign suffocated numerous North Vietnamese Army (NVA) divisions in the South and cut off guerrilla fighters operating elsewhere.[33]  The intense bombing campaign had convinced the Communists in the North that the Americans needed to be removed from the war as quickly as possible.  That included the chance at bringing the negotiating table into the picture as early as May of 1972.[34] This resulted in a several concessions being made between the North and the U.S. at the Paris Peace Talks.[35]

The drive to bring the North to the negotiating continued well into December of 1972 with the introduction of Linebacker II, a further sustained bombing effort to keep the NVA on the defensive.  Linebacker II was a means of showing the NVA that such force was able to be continued if a cease-fire could not be agreed upon.  Further, the operation assured the South that the U.S. was not going to abandon them for a separate peace with the North.  Nixon wanted to ensure that the North would not resurge to risk a fourth large scale air raid campaign.[36] Ultimately, this was exactly what had happened, with the signatures appearing and finalizing the document on 23 January 1973.  However, this agreed-to peace treaty was not the same treaty that the United States had been involved with intimately in the previous year on 8 October.[37]

The final incarnation of the Paris Peace Accords of 1973 left numerous NVA elements in the South, a cease-fire in place, and a pay-out by the U.S. to the North Vietnamese. [38] Nixon, at the time, was confident that he could use American force to apply pressure on the North again if the cease-fire was violated.  The agreement essentially would have left the Vietnam region divided as Korea is today.  However, with Nixon’s resignation over the Watergate scandal, the U.S. commitment to the support of the South Vietnamese government waned.  The further passing of the War Powers Act by the U.S. Congress in 1973 limited all combatant operations to be limited to sixty days without a proper war declaration and approval from Congress.[39] With this, the U.S. was forced to withdraw from South Vietnam, leaving the region unpoliced and unchecked to ensure the security of the ceasefire.

The resulting withdrawal from Vietnam left another power gap in the region, much like the gap that was in place when the Japanese left the region in 1945.  With the remaining NVA forces remaining in the region, this resulted in an unchecked and largely unopposed enemy within their desired territory.  Evacuations and drawdown of military personnel were slow, with the Vietnamization process continuing as forces were exchanged with South Vietnamese counterparts.  As the American military continued withdrawal, the NVA forces advanced.  They were no longer hindered by American resistance or air raids from the USAF.

As the NVA soldiers marched closer to Saigon, evacuations continued to escalate for Americans operating in South Vietnam.  By April of 1975, the NVA was on the doorstep to the city, and emergency evacuations had begun to remove all remaining American personnel.[40] Just two years prior, the NVA was at the mercy of the Americans and forced to a negotiating table by the incredible air power presented by the USAF.  The combined success of the air campaigns in Vietnam had been an awe-inspiring feat, but the repelling of the 1972 Tet Offensive had broken the back of the North.  The culmination of both had brought the NVA to its knees, but just a few years later the NVA was not only on the offensive, but in the home stretch to effectively silence opposition from the South and drive the Americans out.[41]

The USAF actions in the Vietnam War were nothing short of an incredible feat, particularly its ability to carry out long-range, sustained bombing efforts with moderately successful strikes on targets.  The progression of accuracy and efficiency between the Combined Bomber Offensive of World War II and the Sustained Bombing Campaigns of the Vietnam War is relatively surprising for such a short period of time.  155,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on the North by the conclusion of Linebacker I. [42] The idea of bombing the NVA into submission posed by Curtis LeMay had in theory worked.  This in tandem with the deflection of a failed Tet Offensive by the Army had left the North stunned.  In an amazing show of force and strategy, the Vietnam Era Air Force had successfully pulled off quite the feat; delivering a decisive blow and perceived victory on their own.[43]

Unfortunately, the turmoil of Watergate coupled with declining public support for sustaining the war, shows that wars can be lost by ways other than on a battlefield.  They can be lost at home.  Watergate had staunchly weakened Nixon’s grip on the government, and this therefore weakened his grip on the North Vietnamese. [44] While it is certainly true that the war could have once again broke out, the state of the NVA at this time was haphazard at best, owing its only credible asset to the ceasefire-in-place that left its forces scattered about in enemy territory and the replenishing of manpower by the exchange of prisoners. [45] The lack of oversight from the government at home led the enemy to attain a readiness to jump forward and put the entire American military machine on the defense against them as they struggled to immediately withdraw the thousands of military personnel that were in place at the time of the cease-fire.

History has shown itself to repeat in certain ways; doctrinal and situational, whether by purpose or coincidence.  In the instance of the Vietnam War, many similarities can be pulled from previous warfare and seen in the conflict.  This includes the use of large-scale bombing missions, the sometimes-spotty effectiveness of early campaigns, and the strategic methods used to achieve the mission objective.  Many previous wars have also changed how war was fought and been exceptions to many rules.  The Vietnam War serves to be the first in many ways.  However, the most astounding perhaps is that for a moment in history, a force from the air provided the main dominant decisive blow that brought the enemy to their knees.  The sustained bombing campaign worked.  It worked in-so-much as the prediction for the domino theory was proven.  The sad reality is that Watergate shattered the teeth that should have been present in the Paris Peace Accords.  The Linebacker operations had brought the enemy right where the Americans wanted them, but that was unfortunately not in the cards to be a long-staying peace.

There are many facets that go into the outcomes of Vietnam, and there are many reasons that compose the ultimate decision to intervene in the conflict.  These range from social issues to economic issues, ideological to geopolitical, and a clash of doctrine that was incompatible with another.  Vietnam highlighted the importance of counter-insurgency operations, but it also highlighted a need for more effective leadership, communication, and protection of military assets and materiel.  While Secretary of Defense McNamara was a detractor of the Vietnam War, historians and strategists alike do agree with the notion that there are many lessons to be learned in the tragedy known as Vietnam. [46]  Historians such as Mark Moyar have offered up explanations of how triumph in Vietnam was forsaken to the men and women who served.[47]  Historical analysts such as John Lewis Gaddis point out that Linebacker II was the last nail in the coffin, only for the wheels to be torn off at home.[48]  Regardless, the story of the air campaigns in Vietnam is entered in history as just another series of failures.  However, it should truly be entered as one of the USAF’s greatest triumphs.